Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa'Ida and the Holy War The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror The New Rulers of the World Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice and Peace to Rid the World of Evil The Complete Idiot's Guide to Spies and Espionage (Complete Idiot's Guide To...) The Future of Political Islam Showdown : Confronting Bias, Lies, and the Special Interests That Divide America Contemporary Strategic Marketing The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States

• AL-QA'IDA RECRUITMENT VIDEOS PLACED ON WEB.
•  (ANS) -- Portions of what are believed to be secret al-Qa'ida training tapes show a rare glimpse of life inside the terrorist organization.
• Video on these tapes indicates links between Abu Hamza and his Finsbury Park Mosque to al-Qa'ida as well as Kashmiri, Chechen and Palestinian terrorists and the individuals behind World Trade Center One. ...
• The tapes also feature discussion about the bombing of the American Embassy in Africa and how al-Qa'ida was responsible. ...
• There are many indications suggesting a strong connection between Al Hamza, al-Qa'ida and bi Laden. ...
• Continuing to gain the confidence of Abu Hamza, Albert then told him that he wanted to recruit people in England to join the Kashmiri terrorists and the al-Qa'ida but he could do a much more effective job if he could use some old al-Qa'ida training videos. ...
• By e-mail he told me that he wants to expose the al-Qa'ida in the United Kingdom and show that the British laws on refugees are too soft. "Now the whole world can see that the United Kingdom is a major terrorist training base and support center for the al-Qa'ida. ...
• Albert added that the most important thing he wants accomplished by the release of these videos is for the world to see that Abu Hamza is a "major player" for al-Qa'ida. ...

• Al-Qa'ida fører terrorkrigen også i mediene, og har gjort det fra tidlig på 1990-tallet. ...
• Når FFI/Rapport-2002/01393, "DOKUMENTASJON OM AL-QA'IDA - intervjuer, kommunikeer og andre primærkilder 1990-2002" får ekstra oppmerksomhet, er det verdt det fordi rapporten rydder opp i informasjonsrotet.
• Systematisk og kronologisk: Forsker Thomas Hegghammer i FFI-prosjektet TERRA 2 har systematisert primærkildene fra al-Qa'ida og Usama Bin Ladin. ...
• Rapporten presenterer al-Qa'ida med terrororganisasjonens egne formuleringer, først og fremst i intervjuer. Opprydningen tegner et klart bilde av at al-Qa'ida har et mye mer bevisst forhold til å bruke medienes ulike virkemidler for alt det kan gi enn tidligere terrororganisasjoner. ...
• Hegghammer har villet rydde opp i informasjonsjungelen rundt Usama Bin Ladin og al-Qa'ida, for å legge til rette for en kritisk vurdering av tilgjengelige primærkilder. Den kronologiske gjennomgangen viser at al-Qa'ida har hatt en offensiv mediestrategi lenge før terrorangrepet 11. ...
• Fakta mot fjas: Rykter og udokumenterte påstander på Internett-chatsider er blant de mange kilder som har forvirret og forkludret faktakunnskapen om al-Qa'ida, fortalte FFIs adm. ...
• Før 1996 retter al-Qa'ida sin oppmerksomhet mot lokale motstandere, blant dem kong Fahd i Saudi-Arabia. ...
• Fra 1996 blir al-Qa'ida en globalt rettet organisasjon, og erklærer krig mot USA. ... Utspillene vitner om at medieoppmerksomhet og massekommunikasjon er viktigere for al-Qa'ida enn destruksjon. ...
• september 2002 mister al-Qa'ida baser i Afghanistan, og likner også PR-messig mer på andre terror-organisasjoner ved at de framsetter trusler, påtar seg ansvaret for terrorangrep mv. ...
• Terrortrusselen fra al-Qa'ida er et klassisk eksempel på asymmetrisk krig. ...

• The Birth of al-Qa'ida 7. ... A New War The Birth of al-Qa'ida One of the most significant after-effects of the First Gulf War was appreciated only in retrospect: the formation of al-Qa'ida. ... The sacrilege of American forces protecting the holy city enraged bin Laden, and pushed him to create al-Qa'ida from that cadre of mujahideen who still followed him. ...
• It is roughly at this time, at the end of the war in Afghanistan, that al-Qa'ida was formed. ...
• Benjamin Orbach, "Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida: Origin and Doctrines," MERIA Journal, Vol. ...
• The avowed goal of Al Qaeda (often spelled Al-Qa'ida) is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs," according to a U. ...
• Al-Qaida (also spelled also spelled al-Qaeda, al-Qa'ida, al-Quaida, The Base, and is Arabic for the foundation) is a terrorist movement established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 to expand the resistance movement against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan into a pan-Islamic resistance movement. ...

• Perspicacity & Paradigms Online -- Topical Index -- Al-Qa'ida .
• Al-Qa'ida.
• The atrocities committed by radical, sham-Islamic extremists such as Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban  in the name of Islam, whether it be terrorist attacks against people in other countries or barbaric acts of oppression against their own people, are in direct contradiction to the teachings of the Qur'an and the Prophet Mohammed, they are anathema to all true Muslims, and they are an affront to Allah! By Rand Green. ...
• Al-Qa'ida.

• Iraqi Daily: Saddam Ordered Training of Al-Qa'ida Members.
• The independent Iraqi weekly Al-Yawm Al-Aakher reveals details on the training of Al-Qa'ida members operating under the orders of Saddam's Presidential Palace two months before the September 11 attacks. ...
• Al-Qa'ida Group Headed by a Saudi Cleric .
• The Fedayeen command Fedayeen Saddam under Uday's command supervised the 100 Al-Qa'ida fighters directly, to the extent that senior Fedayeen officers visited them constantly and inspected them almost daily, especially during the final days when they transferred them, late at night in two red trucks that belonged to the Ministry of Transportation, to an undisclosed destination. ... " Al-Qa'ida Members Participated in Battles Against U. ...
• And for the sake of history I will say that this division's endurance was due to some formidable fighters, the commanding officer and members of Al-Qa'ida who fought with intensity and brutality that are seldom matched, while they were praising Allah: Allahu Akbar Allahu Akbar What I mean by that are the violent battles that took place along the rapid highway for seventeen consecutive days and forced the Americans to withdraw and re-enter from the industrial area of Nasiriya As for the groups which went to Al-Kifl, they participated in extremely brutal battles. ...

• Policy towards this Axis effect the War on Terrorism? The President's remarks do not imply that the threat posed by Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qa'ida associates have been eliminated but that the United States has expanded the War on Terrorism to include the three most notorious proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. A discussion on the “Axis of Evil” and its relationship to the War on Terrorism is warranted but first I would like to say a few words about the current operations against Al-Qa'ida.
• The Taliban regime has been toppled and the Al-Qa'ida training camps have been destroyed but the war in Afghanistan is by no means over. ... In the past few weeks United States Special Forces have attacked Al-Qa'ida/Taliban elements still operating in Afghanistan and the United States may have to face Taliban elements for some time to come. Even if every Afghan loyal to Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban were subdued, the United States and British led UN peacekeepers still have to deal with factional fighting among elements of the anti-Taliban opposition. Another concern of the United States military is the possibility of a clash with Iran because of Iranian meddling in Afghan affairs by supporting sympathetic warlords against the central pro-western government in Kabul and sheltering Al-Qa'ida fighters. ...
• With Al-Qa'ida still active in over eighty countries, it is clear that the war will involve multiple levels in many areas. The war has broadened to include other fronts like the Philippines where the United States is sending over 650 men and logistical support to the Philippine government in its fight against Abu Sayyaf, a local guerilla group with close ties to Al-Qa'ida. ... The fighting in Afghanistan and the Philippines along with operations in other countries like Somalia and Yemen are not insignificant when it comes to eliminating Al-Qa'ida's bases. The Bush Administration through its the State of the Union address has changed the nature of the war by extending it from a war against Al-Qa'ida to a war against the “ Axis of Evil” along with Al-Qa'ida.
• President Bush expanded the War on Terrorism to a whole new level by clearly lumping Iraq, North Korea and Iran in the same category as Bin Laden, Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. ...
• The evidence of a relationship between Al-Qa'ida and the so-called “Axis of Evil” is tentative at best Al-Qa'ida has been helped by Iraq and Iran before September 11, and Iran is reported to have provided asylum to Al-Qa'ida fighters fleeing Afghanistan. North Korea's relationship with Al-Qa'ida is even more vague, other than unsubstantiated reports that North Korea has provided Anthrax to Al-Qa'ida there is little evidence to connect the last Stalinist Government and the Islamist Al-Qa'ida organization. Lack of evidence does not preclude a connection between the “Axis of Evil” and Al-Qa'ida but there are other countries President Bush did not mention who in the past have helped Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. Pakistan and Syria are not part of the “Axis of Evil” though in the past they backed Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.
• Syria is a key player in the Middle East Peace process and Cuban acquiescence (other than North Korea, the only non-Islamic nation on the State Department's list of Terrorist Sponsoring States ) to the uses of its airspace in transporting Al-Qa'ida prisoners to Guantanamo Bay is highly desirable.

• But even if it is achieved, al-Qa'ida remains. ... And al-Qa'ida's goal – to remove US influence from Islamic countries – is still viable. ... Al-Qa'ida can be said to have achieved a lot in the past six months, even if its bunkers and safe houses are gone and some of its members are dead. ...
• After six months of fighting, probably the best depiction of the US's victories in Afghanistan, and its failures, is: al-Qa'ida is dead, long live al-Qa'ida. ...
• Al-Qa'ida – literally "the base" – is broken as a cohesive single unit, the command structure scattered to the winds, and individual cells fighting, or biding their time, on their own. ...
• Afghanistan is now unsafe as a haven for al-Qa'ida and its supporters. ...
• Al-Qa'ida does not have to erase the US: it simply has to drive wedges between Washington and Islamic opinion – hardly a difficult exercise at the best of times. ... The objective was supposed to be to end the ability of al-Qa'ida to operate. ...
• The African embassy bombings and US retaliation against Afghanistan and (mistakenly) Sudan were in 1998; it was three years before al-Qa'ida struck back at the US. ...
• The US is concentrating on the possible alternative havens for al-Qa'ida, places where individuals and perhaps command elements might relocate: Yemen, Georgia, Somalia, perhaps Sudan. ...

• Let's recall why this all started: the Americans needed to destroy Al-Qa'ida. Since Al-Qa'ida had its senior leaders operating out of Afghanistan, under the protection of the taleban, the plan was to go into Afghanistan and take them out. ... What happened to Al-Qa'ida's leadership? Are they still hiding in Afghanistan, have they migrated to Pakistan, do we even know who they are? Although the conflict resulted in a major military victory it seems the majority of the leadership simply left for another sanctuary.
• The real war is a war to destroy Al-Qa'ida's support and sanctuaries all over the world. That means arresting operatives in the United States, collaborating with friendly governments to help locate terrorist cells in their countries, pressuring neutral or unfriendly governments to deny sanctuary to terrorists, and disrupting Al-Qa'ida's funding. ... Other times, it will depend on the willingness of other governments to pass laws that will make it more difficult for Al-Qa'ida to shift money between its cells. ...
• It seems certain that much of Al-Qa'ida's Afghanistan operations have moved there, yet any outright hostility towards Pakistan would cause America to lose support from its coalition partners.
• Pakistan's fundamentalists - and there are quite a lot of them - happen to have a strong affinity for both the Taleban and Al-Qa'ida. ... Even if he did want to crack down on Al-Qa'ida network within the country, the many Al-Qa'ida sympathizers in the government could easily make any crackdown ineffective. As it stands, most of what used to be Al-Qa'ida's network in Afghanistan seems to be alive and well in Pakistan. ...
• At the same time it must deny Al-Qa'ida that sanctuary. ...
• Once American soldiers leave it's likely that both the Taleban and Al-Qa'ida will attempt to regain influence by making deals with Northern Alliance commanders.

•   Features  |  News & Commentary  |  Primary Sources  |  Activist Guides  |  Support Us  |  Search   Profile of 'Local Leader' of Al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia.
• He trained with the Al-Qa'ida organization (in Afghanistan), trained others, and fought in Bosnia. ... After his release from prison in Saudi Arabia he secretly left for Yemen and arrived in Afghanistan and then returned to Saudi Arabia as leader of Al-Qa'ida.
• " According to security sources, Al-Muqrin is considered "the real leader of the (Al-Qa'ida) organization in Saudi Arabia, succeeding Yusuf al-Ubayri. ...
• During this period he trained recently recruited Al-Qa'ida elements in the central and western regions. ...
• His success in this regard "may have contributed to his assumption of a prominent post, namely the local leader (of the Al-Qa'ida organization in Saudi Arabia). ...
• E-mail this article Print this article Take Action Contact your representatives Protests in your area Related Keywords AfghanistanAl-Qa'idaAlgeriaBosniaEthiopiaLondonSomaliaTalebanYemen Top News Signs That Shiites and Sunnis Are Joining to Battle Americans Dostum's Forces Capture Afghan Town Shia Protests Spread to Basra Analysis: Will the 2004 Election Be Called Off? Why Three Out of Four Experts Predict a Terrorist Attack by November Passive E-Mail Monitoring Leads To Arrest Top Opinion The War Over the War Academia Under Siege The Empire Backfires MIA WMDs--For Bush, It's a Joke The Postmodern Police State and the Battle for Public Space Al Qaeda Transcript: Purported al-Qaida Statement on Madrid Bombings 'Al-Qa'ida' Denies Bin Ladin's Capture Transcript: Full Text of Bin Ladin 4 January Audio Message New Zealand Bans Islamic Group and 25 Individuals 'Jihad-on-Line' Webmaster Says he is Under House Arrest in Gulf State .

• Al-Qa'ida .
• Al-Qa'ida is involved in many fields, from humanitarian work to international terrorism. It is believed that there is no single headquarter of Al-Qa'ida, even if the most profiled leader, Osama bin Laden, has his base in the southern Afghani mountains.
• The senior leaders of Al-Qa'ida around the world, are also senior leaders of other organizations, many involved in terrorist actions.
• The ideology of Al-Qa'ida is rather simple and straightforward: Cleansing of the Muslim countries from corrupt and secular leadership, and fight against the powers that threaten Muslim states and the holy places of Islam. ...
• The structure of Al-Qa'ida is loose, making it both hard to attack, as well as hard to find crucial evidence that it is actually bin Laden's men that are behind it all. ...
• The core of Al-Qa'ida is made up of Osama on top, working close with a Shura Majlis consisting of about 10 members. ...
• Many groups are unaware of other groups in the same country, and very few (if any, including Osama) have total knowledge of what all parts of Al-Qa'ida are involved in at any time.
• These are often men who have lost contact with their home country, who would be imprisoned if they returned: the result is great loyalty to Osama and Al-Qa'ida.
• Al-Qa'ida's main strength lies in its ability to support other organizations with first and foremost money, but also with an ideological framework. The economical activities of Al-Qa'ida are diverse and unclear. ...
• 1988: Al-Qa'ida is formed by Osama bin Laden.
• 1992: Al-Qa'ida signs agreements with many organizations, many involved in terrorist acts. ...
• This is generally considered as the first terrorist attack initiated by Al-Qa'ida, even if the link has never been proved.
• — According to US intelligence, Al-Qa'ida tries to buy components for production of nuclear weaponry. ...
• Al-Qa'ida is suspected of backing the group behind the action.

• The Mind of an Al-Qa'ida Terrorist .
• In 1998 he brought his Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization into a union with the forces of Osama bin Laden, known as Al-Qa'ida (the base), in the effort to create a globalized network of terror whose capacities were demonstrated on September 11, 2001, as well as in the earlier destruction of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and in the damage inflicted on the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden. ...
• Ayman Al-Zawahiri, a surgeon by profession, is the head of the Egyptian "Islamic Jihad" and second in command of the Al-Qa'ida organization. ...
• Following the air attacks by the United States on the Al-Qa'ida bases in Afghanistan, and fearing that he might be killed, Al-Zawahiri was able to smuggle to England a short manuscript detailing the evolution and the travails of the Islamic Jihad and his association with the Islamist movements in Egypt and, ultimately, with bin Laden. ... In addition, "a combination of happenstance and the opportunism of war" allowed a reporter of the Wall Street Journal to acquire for $1100 in Kabul Al-Qa'ida computers left behind following the escape of their operators. ...

• The Al-Qa'ida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002.
• A print version is also available and is published by The Stationery Office Limited as the The Al-Qa'ida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002, ISBN 0 11 039298 1. ...
• The Al-Qa'ida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002.
•  - (1) This Order may be cited as the Al-Qa'ida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002 and shall come into force on 25th January 2002.
• (i) a member of the Al-Qa'ida organisation;.
• The effect of Resolution 1390 is to require States to prohibit the delivery or supply of arms and related matériel and the provision of related technical assistance and training to Usama bin Laden, Al-Qa'ida, the Taliban and their associates as designated in a list by the Security Council. ...

• Archived Entry Want the full story? Islamism Conflict 'may have driven Muslims into arms of al-Qa'ida'.
• The war to topple Saddam Hussein may have damaged the campaign against international terrorism by driving Muslims into the arms of al-Qa'ida, an all-party committee of MPs said yesterday.
• The Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee said al-Qa'ida remained a "significant threat" to Britain, after hearing that the terrorist network may still have the loyalty of more than 17,000 militants in up to 60 countries.
• In a report that raises questions about an important part of the justification for war, MPs said the campaign in Iraq might have "enhanced the appeal of al-Qa'ida to Muslims living in the Gulf region and elsewhere".
• They said: "We cannot conclude that these threats have diminished significantly, in spite of regime change in Iraq and progress in capturing some of the leaders of al-Qa'ida. ... Al-Qa'ida has dangerously large numbers of foot soldiers and has demonstrated an alarming capacity to regenerate itself.
• "In spite of some notable progress, al-Qa'ida continues to pose a substantial threat to British citizens in the United Kingdom and abroad. ...
• The committee heard evidence from Paul Wilkinson, professor of International Relations at St Andrews University, who said conservative estimates suggested that al-Qa'ida had at least 17,000 trained terrorists. ...
• The former Tory chancellor Kenneth Clarke told the BBC: "I think it is likely that the American and British invasion of Iraq and the occupation of the country will boost al-Qa'ida. ...
• * The war in Iraq may have "impeded the campaign against al-Qa'ida" and "enhanced the appeal" of the terror network to Muslims in the Gulf.
• * Al-Qa'ida may command 17,000 trained terrorists in 60 countries.

• July 21, 2002 US WARY OF PAKISTAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES' LINKS TO AL-QA'IDA Source: Independent News .
• There are rumours, for example, that intelligence officers helped to hide three al-Qa'ida members after a gun battle in a village in Waziristan, in the border tribal territories on 25 June in which 10 soldiers were killed. US agents in Pakistan suspect that several of their raids on remote villages in Waziristan were betrayed to al-Qa'ida operatives in advance. ... Because of the past co-operation between the Taliban – and by extension al-Qa'ida and Pakistan's intelligence services – many Pakistan Special Branch and Field Security Wing officers are working blind, forced to build up entirely new files on militants who remain well known to elements of the ISI. ...

• Islamist Website: An Imminent Terrorist Attack (Possibly by Al-Qa'ida) Within "About Ten Days" .
• Two pictures of bin Laden were added to the exhortation, one with an image of the World Trade Center in flames, hinting, possibly, to an Al-Qa'ida connection. ...

• Al-Qa'ida (The Base).
•   Al-Qa'ida - Articles  .
•   Al-Qa'ida - Documents  .

• The prime suspect in the spate of terrorist attacks against the United States is Osama bin-Laden's organization, Al-Qa'ida. An umbrella organization with an operational reach that stretches around the globe, Al-Qa'ida has been extremely successful at maintaining a high level of security and secrecy.
• This is partly due to the fact that Al-Qa'ida operates as an umbrella group supporting a host of cells around the world. ... Additionally, Al-Qa'ida coordinates operations and activities with various other terrorist organizations around the world. ...
• Bin Laden himsefl has repeatedly threatened acts of terrorism against the United States, and Al-Qa'ida was pinpointed in the attacks on the U. ...
• But Al-Qa'ida tops the list of suspects for two reasons. ... Al-Qa'ida is the only known terrorist organization who meets both descriptions.
• Also, its coordination with other militant groups gives Al-Qa'ida access to commanders with years of experience in everything from bomb-making to suicide attacks. ...
• No evidence has emerged that link Al-Qa'ida or bin Laden directly to the attacks on New York and Washington. ...

• Israelis 'spied on al-Qa'ida in America' .
• American agents have dismantled an Israeli spy network, which may have been watching al-Qa'ida members inside the US before the 11 September attacks, French publications reported yesterday.
• Nothing in the extracts from the DEA report published by Le Monde suggests a link between the Israeli "agents" and al-Qa'ida. But the newspaper says that the fact that many of the Israelis were based near Ford Lauderdale – close to places where al-Qa'ida agents involved in the 11 September suicide hijackings were also based – has aroused the suspicions of the authorities. The newspaper says that some American officials believe the Israeli students were trailing al-Qa'ida operatives, without informing their American counterparts. ...
• "Israelis 'spied on al-Qa'ida in America'" | Login/Create an account| 0 comments.

• Al-Qa'ida .
• Al-Qa'ida - Articles .

• Pakistan launches offensive against al-Qa'ida .
• Pakistan launched its largest-ever military offensive against al-Qa'ida and other militants in a rugged tribal region bordering Afghanistan today, killing at least 12 suspects and arresting 10 more. ...
• Ten al-Qa'ida suspects, blindfolded and with their hands tied behind their backs, were led away from the area. ... It was not immediately clear if any top-ranking al-Qa'ida operatives were among them. ... Some 200 Pakistani troops reportedly took part, and General Shaukat Sultan, an army spokesman, said it was the army's largest-ever offensive against al-Qa'ida, and the largest army operation to date in the fiercely autonomous tribal areas. ... At least nine hours later, gunfire could be heard coming from a group of compounds where Faisal said other al-Qa'ida suspects had taken refuge. ... "Al-Qa'ida people have taken refuge in these five big compounds. ... It was the first time the army has allowed journalists to witness an operation against al-Qa'ida suspects. ... The troops moved in after receiving word that al-Qa'ida operatives had sneaked into the area from Afghanistan, the army said in a statement. ... Al-Qa'ida may be against America, but they are certainly not against Pakistan and Muslims," he said. ...

•  Myth:  The President didn't treat al-Qa'ida as a serious threat before September 11.
• The President recognized the threat posed by al-Qa'ida, and immediately after taking office the White House began work on a comprehensive new strategy to eliminate al-Qa'ida.
• Rice that he was "tired of swatting flies" and wanted to go on the offense against al-Qa'ida, rather than simply waiting to respond.
•    The new strategy called for military options to attack al-Qa'ida and Taliban leadership, command-and-control, ground forces, and other targets.   It focused on the crucial link between al-Qa'ida and the Taliban, recognizing that the two were ultimately inseparable.   We would attempt to compel the Taliban to stop giving al-Qa'ida sanctuary, and if it refused, we would have sufficient military options to remove the Taliban regime. ...
•  NSC Deputies, the second-ranking officials in the NSC departments, met frequently between March and September 2001 to decide the many complex issues involved in the development of the comprehensive strategy against al-Qa'ida, and also oversaw the work by their staffs on these issues. Contrary to Dick Clarke's assertion that he was not able to brief senior officials until April 30, the first Deputies-level meeting on al-Qa'ida was held on March 7, and Dick Clarke conducted the briefing.   Deputies agreed that a National Security Policy Directive on al-Qa'ida should be prepared.
•   Clarke had proposed ideas against al-Qa'ida, such as launching missiles from an armed Predator or modestly increasing assistance to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, that would have prevented 9-11 but these plans were not acted upon.
• Rice's request, in January 2001, Dick Clarke presented her with a number of ideas to address the al-Qa'ida threat. ...   For example, the Administration approved increased assistance to Uzbekistan, a frontline state in opposing al-Qa'ida, and pushed hard to develop a weaponized Predator unmanned aerial vehicle.
•   At the same time, the Intelligence Community also told senior Administration officials that killing bin Ladin would not destroy al-Qa'ida. ...
•    NSC Deputies developed a more comprehensive strategy to eliminate al-Qa'ida that included assisting tribal groups throughout the country, as well as providing significantly more assistance to the Northern Alliance. ...
• Although Clarke suggested some ideas to address al-Qa'ida outside the United States, he did not advocate to the Bush Administration any plan of action to address al-Qa'ida's presence in the United States, such as the need to improve collection of intelligence information by the FBI and to reverse longstanding statutory restrictions and DoJ policies limiting sharing of domestic intelligence on terrorism between the CIA and FBI; or to take actions to root out al-Qa'ida cells in the United States and to make our borders less porous for al-Qa'ida and other terrorists. ...
•  Myth:  Dick Clarke was never allowed to brief the President on the threat posed by al-Qa'ida.

• Al-Qa'ida y Osama ben Laden: un estudio "definitivo" sin "soluciones finales" .
• Al-Qa'ida y Osama ben Laden: un estudio "definitivo" sin "soluciones finales" Recensión del libro de Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. ... org Al-Qa'ida y Osama ben Laden: un estudio "definitivo" sin "soluciones finales" por Massimo Introvigne y T. ... Global Network of Terror (1) ("Dentro al-Qa'ida. ... La pretensión -si nos referimos a la descripción del fenómeno- no es excesiva, y Gunaratna, que es asesor de varios gobiernos y de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, ha tenido acceso a un gran número de expedientes reservados relacionados con al-Qa'ida, también participando personalmente al interrogatorio de miembros de la organización detenidos en varios países, antes y después del 11 de septiembre de 2001. Utiliza además publicaciones clandestinas de al-Qa'ida a las que no muchos estudiosos tuvieron acceso, como la Enciclopedia de la Jihad Afgana, un texto de alrededor de siete mil páginas, y el volumen de reflexiones, en árabe, publicado clandestinamente en Londres por el editor Al-Sharq al-Awsat en diciembre de 2001 con el título Caballeros bajo la bandera del Profeta. Meditaciones sobre el movimiento jihadista, que comprende las reflexiones del médico egipcio Ayman al-Zawahiri, número dos de al-Qa'ida, sobre el futuro del movimiento tras el 11-S. ... Al-Qa'ida, según Gunaratna, constituye un movimiento cualitativamente y cuantitativamente distinto de todos los grupos terroristas que la historia reciente ha conocido. Bien lejos de ser esa realidad marginal que algunos estudiosos del fundamentalismo islámico -deseosos sobre todo de contestar la posición sobre el punto de la CIA y de la administración estadounidense- habían creído poder describir en la década de los noventa, al-Qa'ida aparece como la mayor organización terrorista que la historia haya conocido, con un número de agentes -varias decenas de miles, aunque las estimaciones sean objeto de controversias-, armas y disponibilidades financieras paragonables no tanto a las cifras de movimientos terroristas del pasado cuanto a las posibilidades de un pequeño -pero bien armado- Estado contemporáneo. Mientras el pasado ha conocido grupos terroristas controlados por Estados, al-Qa'ida aspira -y lo había conseguido, en el caso de Afganistán- a ser un grupo terrorista que controla Estados. ... Esta popularidad se traduce en un contínuo flujo de financiaciones, las cuales se añaden a las importantes contribuciones de organizaciones caritativas internacionales islámicas cuyas cúpulas simpatizan por al-Qa'ida o están -muy a menudo- infiltradas, así que la fortuna personal de ben Laden contribuye sólo en parte minoritaria a la solidez financiera de la organización, que además descansa asimismo sobre un sistema internacional de fraudes a las sociedades de tarjetas de crédito, mientras parece que ben Laden, a diferencia de los talibanes afganos, haya siempre rechazado su participación en el tráfico de drogas. La historia de al-Qa'ida es en gran parte conocida (4) y la reconstrucción de Gunaratna es tan detallada y atenta al particular -nos ofrece, por ejemplo, el número de teléfono satelitar usado por años por ben Laden y los nombres de los hoteles donde pernoctaron los principales agentes de al-Qa'ida en sus viajes- que por momentos resulta difícil su lectura, también porque algunos de los protagonistas utilizan un exorbitante número de nombres falsos -más de cuarenta en el caso de Ramzi Ahmed Yousef-, consiguiendo confundir -si no los servicios secretos que les siguen la pista- al menos al lector medio del tomo.

• The identity of and information on a key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the September 11 attacks. ...
• With respect to the key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the September 11 attacks, the DCI declined to declassify his identity despite an enormous volume of media reporting on this individual. ...
• Any information obtained after September 11 about the hijackers and their backgrounds (including their involvement with al-Qa'ida), entry into this, country, and activities while in this country, as well as why they never came to the attention of the U. ...
• That chronology, which I request be made part of the hearing record, notes significant events in international terrorism, with particular attention to the rise of Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida. ...
• The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the subsequent discovery in 1993 of plots to bomb New York City landmarks, and the arrest in 1999 during the Millennium celebrations of an individual with al-Qa'ida connections intending to bomb Los Angeles International Airport should have erased any doubts, to the extent they existed, about that point; .
• By late 1998, the Intelligence Community had amassed a growing body of information, though general in nature and lacking specific details on time and place, indicating that Bin Ladin and the al-Qa'ida network intended to strike within the United States; and .
• Concern about Bin Ladin continued to grow over time and reached peak levels in the spring and summer of 2001, as the Intelligence Community faced increasing numbers of reports of imminent al-Qa'ida attacks against U. ...
• Although the specific actions of al-Qa'ida often did not enjoy widespread support, the causes it championed were often viewed as legitimate, indeed laudable, in much of the Muslim world. ...
•  Compounding the resource problems, the staff has been told by numerous individuals that al-Qa'ida proved an exceptionally difficult target for U. ... Details of major terrorist plots were not widely shared in the al-Qa'ida organization, making it hard to develop the necessary intelligence to pre-empt or disrupt an attack. In addition, senior al-Qa'ida officials were very sensitive to the need for operational security. ... Many al-Qa'ida members also enjoyed the benefits of sanctuary in Afghanistan, allowing them to plan and prepare in relative freedom. Finally, we were told that senior members of al-Qa'ida were skilled and purposeful: they learned from their mistakes, and they were flexible in their organization and plans. ...
• For example, there were the Community's unsuccessful efforts against a key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the September 11 attacks, whose identity the DCI has declined to declassify. By late 2000 and into 2001, the Intelligence Community was engaged with foreign intelligence and law enforcement partners in an extensive, shadowy struggle against al-Qa'ida. ...
• The Intelligence Community has acquired additional information since then indicating there may be links between this group and other terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida; .

• American spokesmen have pointed the finger towards Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian associate of al-Qa'ida, who is believed to have fought alongside Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora in Afghanistan.
• Al-Qa'ida appeared to take the unusual step yesterday of publicly denying that it was involved in the attack. The London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper yesterday received a letter by e-mail, purporting to come from al-Qa'ida's Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades.
• That would sit oddly with the accusations against al-Qa'ida. The overwhelming majority of Iranians are Shia - and there are believed to be no Shia in al-Qa'ida. ...

•      AL-QA'IDA PLANNED WESTERN FOREST FIRESTORM.
• JULY 11 -- BOISE, IDAHO:   National forests and grasslands across the West were planned targets for al-Qa'ida attacks, according to an FBI memo sent to law enforcement agencies on June 25. ...
• A senior al-Qa'ida detainee told federal investigators about the plan to set summer wildfires in Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. ...

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